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 Overview  
The FASB adopted a balance sheet-based model of financial reporting about 30 years ago, and this 
model has been gradually expanded and solidified to become the required norm around the world 
today.  Currently, the FASB and the IASB are re-considering their Conceptual Framework, and this is 
the right time to have a much-needed debate about the proper conceptual foundations of accounting.  
This paper argues that the balance sheet orientation of accounting standard-setting is flawed, for the 
following reasons: 
1. Accounting is supposed to reflect business reality, and thus the essential features of the financial 
reporting model need to reflect the essential features of the underlying business model.  However, the 
balance sheet orientation of financial reporting is at odds with the economic process of advancing 
expenses to earn revenues, which governs how most businesses create value, and which represents how 
managers and investors view most firms.   
 
2. The adoption of the balance sheet approach was driven by conceptual considerations; standard 
setters argued that the concept of assets is more fundamental and logically prior to the concept of 
income.  However, this paper argues that the concept of income is clearer and practically more useful 
than the concept of assets, especially with the recent proliferation of intangible assets.   
 
3. Earnings is the single most important output of the accounting system.  Thus, intuitively, improved 
financial reporting should lead to improved usefulness of earnings.  However, the continual expansion 
of the balance sheet approach is gradually destroying the forward-looking usefulness of earnings, 
mainly through the effect of various asset re-valuations, which manifest as noise in the process of 
generating normal operating earnings.  During the last 40 years, the volatility of reported earnings has 
doubled and the persistence of earnings has gone down by about a third, while there is little change in 
the properties of the underlying business fundamentals.   
 
4. The balance sheet approach has pushed accounting into incorporating more and more valuation 
estimates into financial reports, creating tautological and dangerous feedback loops between financial 
markets and the real economy.   
 
The paper concludes with two suggestions about a “good” model of financial reporting.  The first 
suggestion is that accounting needs to make a sharp theoretical and practical distinction between 
operating and financing-type activities and assets, and this distinction needs to be reflected in all 
financial statements.  The second suggestion is that for most firms the accounting for operating 
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 I. Introduction 
Currently, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) are re-considering their conceptual frameworks.  This re-assessment is a key 
part of the two Boards’ strategic plan for long-term convergence of the two dominant systems of 
financial accounting since agreement on specific issues is difficult without shared conceptual 
foundations.  The project is still in its early stages and there is no clear indication on the ultimate form 
of the compromise that is likely to be reached.  On the table are foundational concepts like “assets”, 
“liabilities”, and “revenue recognition”, implying that the effect of the decisions about to be reached 
will impact the state of financial reporting for decades to come (see Bullen and Crook 2005 and 
McGregor and Street 2007 for a more complete account of the scope of this project). 
This new development is necessary and welcome since uniformity and comparability of 
accounting standards around the world is a laudable goal.  However, uniformity in itself is not enough, 
and in fact may turn out to be harmful unless it embraces the “right” principles for financial 
accounting.  The point is that the Boards’ re-consideration of the conceptual framework does not 
include a re-assessment of its balance-sheet orientation, which has become the dominant feature of 
financial reporting during the last 30 years.  This paper argues that this is a grave shortcoming and it 
calls on the Boards to expand their effort to a more thorough re-assessment of their conceptual 
framework.  The income-statement approach to accounting is the natural foundation for financial 
reporting for most firms, and a disregard for this approach is bound to result in faulty accounting, no 
matter what desirable characteristics the rest of the financial reporting model might have. The rest of 
the paper develops these arguments in more detail, concluding with suggestions about what a good 
model of financial reporting might look like. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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 II. History and background for the current developments 
Some sense of history and a review of the balance sheet versus the income statement approach to 
accounting help to provide a proper context.  There is a long-standing debate in accounting about two 
alternative and competing approaches to doing financial reporting.  The essence of the so-called 
balance sheet-based approach is that it views the proper valuation of assets and liabilities as the 
primary goal of financial reporting, with the determination of other accounting variables considered 
secondary and derivative.  The principal implication from this perspective is that the determination of 
income statement amounts and especially earnings is governed by balance sheet considerations.  The 
balance sheet approach, take1n to its logical conclusion and extreme, prescribes that the correct 
determination of assets and liabilities completely determines earnings, where earnings for a given 
period is simply the change in net assets over that period (adjusted for distributions and contributions 
from equity holders).  This view of earnings has strong underpinnings in economics, where it is known 
as “Hicksian income” 1.  
In contrast, the income statement approach views the determination of revenues, expenses, and 
especially earnings, as the primary goal of financial reporting.  The emphasis here is on the proper 
determination of the timing and magnitude of the revenue and expense amounts, whereas balance sheet 
accounts and amounts are secondary and derivative.  The two major guiding principles in this process 
are the revenue recognition principle and the matching of expenses to revenues principle.  The goal of 
accounting is to record accruals, which properly record the timing of economic achievements (revenue) 
and the alignment of associated expenses (matching).  Balance sheet accounts and amounts are mostly 
the residual of this process, and assets and liabilities are in essence the cumulative effect of periodic 
accruals.  For example, accounts receivable arise because revenue is recorded before actual collections, 
and the PPE (property, plant, and equipment) account represents unexpired costs of acquired 
equipment.  The income statement approach has always had strong support among accounting 
practitioners, and especially in the investment community.  Investment managers and financial analysts 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 
1 Proponents of the balance sheet model and fair value-type accounting frequently use the Hicksian idea of income as one 
of their key constructs and arguments.  It is little known that John Hicks himself advocated historical cost accounting and 
recommended against including fair value-type estimates in financial statements, see Brief (1982) for a review of Hicks’ 
views on accounting.  In addition, note that the Hicksian definition of income requires that wealth be measured well at both 
beginning and end.  When there are difficulties in measuring wealth, e.g., when using fair value accounting for operating 
assets, the resulting change in wealth is not really “Hicksian income”, so invoking the Hicksian income concept becomes 
strained. 
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 primarily think of stock value as arising from the firms’ ability to generate a stream of earnings, and 
therefore the correct determination of earnings should be the goal of financial reporting. 
Although there is an inherent conceptual tension between these two approaches, in practice 
financial accounting has always been a pragmatic compromise between them.  Historically, the income 
statement view of financial reporting was dominant in accounting.  By the first half of the 20th 
century, this view was firmly embedded in the theory and practice of accounting, reaching its epitome 
in Paton and Littleton (1940), which was an enormously influential work and was later proclaimed 
“The Accounting Book of the Century”.  Looking back on Paton and Littleton (1940) today is 
fascinating and instructive because the book is entirely built around income statement concepts and 
problems, and balance sheet considerations are relegated to a peripheral status.  It should be 
emphasized that there have always been proponents of a balance sheet and even fair value approaches 
to accounting.  For example, MacNeal (1939) and Chambers (1966) can be viewed as early proponents 
of fair value accounting for assets.  On balance, though, it is fair to say that the income statement 
approach to financial accounting dominated theory, practice, standard setting, and pedagogy all the 
way until the mid-1970’s. 
An important new stage in the development of accounting was set in 1973, with the start of 
FASB’s reign as the official standard setter in the U.S.  The predecessor of the FASB, the Accounting 
Principles Board (APB) was a part-time organization, with limited staff and resources.  Thus, the 
emphasis in the APB’s work was mostly on codifying and clarifying existing principles of accounting, 
with little ability or attempt to influence financial reporting in a major way.  Widespread dissatisfaction 
with the APB’s work led to the creation of the FASB as a full-time professional unit, which was much 
better funded and staffed, and was ready and able to pursue a more ambitious and activist approach to 
accounting standard setting.  For the interested reader, Storey and Storey (1998) provides an 
exhaustive account of these developments.   
Soon after the FASB started work, it became apparent that a piecemeal approach to standard-
setting was not going to work because absent shared conceptual foundations there were bound to be 
internal inconsistencies and even contradictions across the standards that govern specific accounting 
areas due to changing Board composition, political pressures, and the effect of a myriad of other 
idiosyncratic factors.  Thus, at the very dawn of its existence the FASB embarked on an extensive 
project to provide a conceptually sound and workable foundation for financial reporting and standard-
setting.  The FASB received several rounds of input from its constituencies and was engaged in 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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 vigorous internal and external debates as it was clear that the nature of the conceptual foundation 
would have a major influence on all future standard-setting activities and on the economy and the 
world at large.  In its work, the Board quickly reached two conclusions; first, the income statement and 
the balance sheet approaches to accounting are the two major alternatives for a financial reporting 
model; second, to ensure conceptual clarity and internal consistency one has to choose one versus the 
other alternative, and avoid a muddled compromise between them.   
Against this background, the FASB reached a major decision in the late 1970’s.  The Board 
concluded that the balance sheet approach is the only logical and conceptually sound basis of 
accounting and therefore the balance sheet approach should become the cornerstone of standard-setting 
and financial accounting in general.  Storey and Storey (1998), Bullen and Crook (2005) and other 
accounts of this decision clearly indicate that the main reason for this conclusion was the perceived 
conceptual supremacy of the balance sheet approach.  In a nutshell, the FASB’s reasoning can be 
summarized as follows.  Earnings is a “change in value” concept, and it is impossible to define a 
“change in value” concept before one defines what “value” is.  Thus, the determination of assets and 
liabilities logically precedes and supercedes the determination of earnings, which implies that the 
balance sheet approach is the natural basis of accounting.  In contrast, the income statement approach 
is conceptually suspect because it relies on vague concepts like matching.  In addition, the 
implementation of the income statement approach results in deferrals and accruals, which create assets 
and liabilities of questionable substance (see Sprouse 1966 for an early and forceful exposition of this 
view).  For example, if a shipping company books a provision for the future scraping of barnacles off 
its ships, that creates a liability.  But there seems to be little economic substance to this liability, as the 
company is not really liable to anybody because of this provision. 
During the years that followed, accounting standard setters have been expanding and 
solidifying the balance sheet approach on several dimensions.  First, there has been a gradual transition 
of older rules to conform to the new conceptual framework.  For example, APB Opinion 11 from 1967, 
which prescribed an income statement approach for income tax reporting, was superseded by a balance 
sheet orientation in SFAS 96 in 1987 and SFAS 109 in 1992, and the change was specifically 
motivated by a desire to conform to FASB’s conceptual framework.  Second, the FASB has been 
increasingly adopting more pure and extreme forms of the balance sheet approach, particularly with 
the recent broad initiative for moving to “fair value” accounting.  As the name suggests, fair value 
accounting affirms the primacy of market and market-type prices as the benchmark for value for 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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 company accounting.  Specific examples of fair value accounting include SFAS 133 in 1999 (hedging), 
SFAS 141 in 2001 (acquisitions and goodwill accounting), SFAS 156 in 2006 (securitization) and the 
recent sweeping SFAS 159, which allows fair value accounting for a broad class of assets and 
liabilities.  As a subject, fair value accounting is significant enough to merit separate and deeper study, 
and the interested reader is referred to more focused efforts in this direction, e.g., Nissim and Penman 
(2007).  This article takes a broader perspective, and views fair value accounting as just the latest and 
more extreme form of a longer evolution that has been gaining momentum for the last 30 years. 
The balance sheet approach has also expanded geographically, moving from its U.S. roots to 
international standard setting, and in the process becoming the dominant world-wide accounting 
doctrine today.  Since the beginning of its existence, the FASB has been a model for international 
standard setting, where various foreign bodies sought to emulate the success and power that the FASB 
exerts in the U.S.  Specifically, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was 
founded in 1973, and the conceptual framework it issued in 1989 was heavily based on FASB’s, 
adopting the balance-sheet model of reporting (Camfferman and Zeff 2007, pages 259-264).  The 
IASC was eventually replaced in 2001 by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
largely modeled after the FASB’s organization and process, and cross-sharing with it a number of key 
personnel2.   Recently, the two Boards have actively sought to co-ordinate their philosophy and 
activities, adopting in 2002 a formal memorandum known as “The Norwalk Agreement”, which details 
their joint commitment to convergence of U.S. and international accounting standards.  Since such 
convergence is only possible under shared conceptual foundations, the two Boards share a firm 
commitment to the balance sheet approach.  For the rest of this paper, the arguments and the discussion 
focus on the U.S. and the FASB experience but the analysis that follows largely generalizes to the 
international domain as well. 
On July 6, 2006 the FASB issued a document called Preliminary Views (see Financial 
Accounting Series 1260-001), which summarizes the Boards’ current thinking about the Conceptual 
Framework and asks for feedback.  The Preliminary Views represents an initial step before issuing a 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 
2 For example, James Leisenring held a number of positions at the FASB since 1982, including being a member from 1987 
to 2000, and was the Director of International Activities, when he left in 2001 to join as a member of the IASB.  Anthony 
Cope was a member of the FASB from 1993 until 2001, when he left to become a member of the IASB.  Thomas Jones, the 
current Vice Chairman of the IASB, was previously a trustee for the Financial Accounting Foundation (which oversees the 
FASB), and was a member of FASB’s Emerging Issues Task Force.  Mary Barth, a professor from Stanford University, 
served on the FASB Advisory Council until 2001 when she became a part-time member of the IASB.  The current 
Chairman of the FASB, Robert Herz, was a part-time member of the IASB before joining the FASB.    
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 more formal Exposure Draft but it already contains a number of important indications about the shape 
of the future Conceptual Framework.  For example, the Conceptual Framework is envisioned as a 
single, unified document, along the lines of IASB’s existing framework rather than being like FASB’s 
collection of seven Concept Statements.  Also, the Conceptual Framework will have a high standing in 
the hierarchy of financial reporting rules, and specific standards will be expected to comply and 
embody the Framework.  For the purposes of this paper, though, the most important aspect of the 
Preliminary Views document is that the Boards have decided to concentrate on ironing out existing 
inconsistencies within and across the two systems of financial reporting rather than on a deep review 
and re-thinking of the entire existing conceptual foundation (paragraph P7).  In fact, the Preliminary 
Views presents a strong endorsement of the balance sheet model of financial reporting, and envisions a 
further deterioration in the status of the income statement and earnings in particular. 
The magnitude and even the language of the proposed changes is startling, especially 
considering what steps would likely be taken to flesh out the proposed conceptual framework in 
specific financial accounting standards.  For one thing, the Preliminary Views largely shies away from 
using terms like “revenues”, “expenses”, “earnings” and “income”, mentioning them only as a nod to 
existing conventions (paragraph BC1.30.).  The preferred terms in the Preliminary Views are variations 
on “changes in economic resources and claims to them” (paragraphs OB22 and BC1.28.), a language 
that embodies pure-grade balance sheet accounting3.   A more substantive and indeed critical change in 
the proposed framework concerns the importance of earnings in financial reporting.  Note that FASB’s 
existing conceptual framework has always had a somewhat dual nature: on the one hand, it endorsed a 
balance sheet model of accounting, but on the other hand, it also had a formal statement about the 
primary importance of earnings in financial reporting.  Specifically, FASB’s Concepts Statement 1 
(paragraph 43) says: 
“The primary focus of financial reporting is information about an enterprise’s performance 
provided by measures of (comprehensive income) and its components.  Investors, creditors and 
others, who are concerned with assessing the prospects for enterprise cash flows are especially 
interested in this information”. 
 
The Preliminary Views, however, clearly states: 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 
3 In addition, the term “matching” is never used, even in passing.     
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 “… to designate one type of information as the primary focus of financial reporting would be
 inappropriate”. (paragraph BC1.29.) 
 
“Displays of … changes in economic resources and claims, and displays of the list of economic 
resources are equally important”. (paragraph BC1.30.) 
 
Of course, the implication is that now standard setters view earnings much less important than 
before4. Summarizing, the Preliminary Views crowns and further develops the balance sheet model of 




                                                 
4 Over the years FASB members and affiliated parties repeatedly denied that the adoption of the balance sheet model leads 
to decreased emphasis on the primary importance of earnings, e.g. Storey and Storey (1998), page 82.   
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III. A critique of the balance sheet-based model of financial reporting 
The critique is built around the following four main themes: 
A.  The balance sheet approach is problematic because it is at odds with how most businesses 
operate, create value, and are managed 
Most firms are essentially sophisticated devices for continually advancing expenses, hoping to 
earn revenue and earnings.  In relation to this fundamental purpose, most assets are just supplementary 
and temporary devices; they are props that serve the continual stream of company operations and have 
little independent existence and value.  Notice that the balance sheet approach would make sense if 
firms were “asset greenhouses”, where the primary mission of the firm is to earn money by acquiring 
assets, storing and growing them, and earnings represents the realized or unrealized growth in these 
assets.  But most firms are not like asset greenhouses, they are more like “asset furnaces”, where 
acquired or internally-created assets are continually sacrificed or transformed for the larger goal of 
producing revenue and earnings.  The balance sheet makes it look like there is a permanent store of 
assets and asset values but this impression is illusory because the stock of assets only exists because of 
the continuous process of asset renewal and sacrifice.   
Relaxing the continuity of this process clearly reveals the temporary and subservient nature of 
most assets.  For example, in the late Middle Ages the Italian trading guilds business was much more 
fragmented and piecemeal.  Partners would get together to finance the purchase or rental of a ship, 
appoint the crew and advance other expenses.  On completing the trading mission, the partners would 
split the profits, dissolve the partnership, and possibly start considering other ventures.  In this 
example, it is clear that what really matters is the expenses advanced, and the revenue and profits 
ultimately earned.  The assets (ship, inventory) are just temporary implements to carry out the trading 
business.  This situation is far from an isolated historical curiosity, and is commonly found in business 
today.  For example, many consulting firms operate on a project-by-project basis, and the key to 
creating value in this business is making sure that the revenues on the piecemeal projects exceed the 
requisite costs by a reasonable margin.  In addition, even if practiced, assigning “assets” to each 
project has a temporary and provisional nature.  Similar observations apply to construction businesses, 
shipbuilding, businesses related to military contracts, etc.  
Note that in practice there is no real dichotomy between continual and piecemeal types of 
business, where most firms embody some varying mixture of both.  This mixture also varies with the 
time horizon,  where  more  and  more of  a  firm’s business  represents one-shot  projects  over  longer  
 horizons.  As the horizon lengthens, whole product lines and divisions represent one-shot deals, and 
the firm itself is a one-shot project over its complete life.  Once the firm is finished, all assets are 
dissolved, and the only thing that leaves a lasting impact is the cumulative amount of revenue earned, 
costs incurred, and resulting and distributed earnings. 
The point is that if firms operate as a process of advancing expenses to earn revenues, and 
assets have a secondary and supporting role in this process, then proper accounting needs to reflect and 
follow this reality, and that implies a natural and logical supremacy for the income statement view of 
financial reporting.  Accounting can be defined as a system of tracking wealth and the creation of 
wealth in an economic unit.  Intuitively, the essential features of the economic process of wealth 
creation have to be reflected in the essential features of the accounting system that tracks this process.  
It truly is like putting the horse before the cart if firm operations follow income statement logic, while 
the financial reporting process follows balance sheet logic.   
Since most businesses follow an income statement mode of operations, it is not surprising that 
managers manage their businesses following an income statement approach.  When managers prepare 
budgets they produce a forecast of revenues first, followed by a prediction of costs needed to support 
this revenue.  It is only after the budgeted income statement is produced that managers will think about 
the asset base necessary to support these projections and the financing needed to make all of this 
happen5.   The same process applies to managerial decisions like opening a new product line or 
starting a new division.  Managers would think about the total operating and investment costs needed 
to get this project going, the revenue that is likely to be earned, and whether the resulting return on 
investment is acceptable.  Managers would not think about the build-up of assets in a new division as 
the source of added value; if anything, excessive build-up of assets is a drag on firm performance.   
Investors, which the FASB recognizes as the most important users of financial reporting 
information, also base their decisions on income statement considerations.  For example, the typical 
valuation of a business starts with a projection of revenues and costs first, followed by balance sheet 
amounts and the resulting free cash flows.  Consider also that when financial analysts go beyond the 
prediction of earnings, they typically produce some sort of an income statement.  Analysts’ projections 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 
5 Of course, in practice there are many variations in the order presented above, e.g., the managers of a rapidly growing retail 
chain may first think about the maximum possible number of new stores they can open (assets), which will drive the 
prediction of sales.  However, the point is that even in this situation managers care about assets first because they hope that 
the asset expansion will drive sales, which is where value is created in this business.  Managers are not opening stores 
hoping that stores will go up in value, creating earnings; even if this happens, store value appreciation is incidental to the 
business.   
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 of balance sheet amounts are rare, and one never sees a projection of balance sheet amounts as a means 
to compute changes in net assets, which will comprise earnings.  Similar observations and conclusions 
apply to the activities of most other parties interested in the success of firm activities, including 
participants in mergers and acquisitions and credit lending. 
To put the preceding ideas in a different way, the main problem with the balance sheet 
approach is that it is largely silent about the notions of business model and business performance, 
which are central to a firm’s success and value-creation.  The balance sheet model takes asset values as 
given, as stores of value, which are divorced from what the firm is doing, and diverts attention from 
operations, which are the key to firm success and value.  In contrast, the income statement model by its 
nature focuses attention on firm operations, on the fact that firm value arises not from a static pile of 
resources but from continually using and putting these resources at risk in executing a business model.  
The income statement model clearly reveals that business success is determined in real operations, 
where the firm must go out and engage customers and markets for its goods or services, and where it is 
the customers that provide the ultimate business model verification by buying and paying for what the 
company offers.  The fact that sales to a customer is the critical verification of a company’s business 
model is recognized in accounting as the order in the process of recognition of income, where revenue 
recognition comes first, and then in turn triggering the recognition of expenses and income.  In 
contrast, the balance sheet model makes it look like firm value comes from the value of a store of 
resources, e.g., as valued at exit prices in fair value accounting.  In short, for most firms the value of 
their resources comes from value-in use and not from value-in-exchange.  The firm is a process and not 
a collection of “things”, implying that the income statement model is the natural foundation for 
financial reporting. 
To illustrate and bolster the arguments above, Table 1 provides empirical evidence about the 
relative roles of internal use vs. market-based considerations for the most typical and largest group of 
operating assets, PPE.  Table 1 lists the aggregate stocks and flows of U.S. firms’ PPE over the last 15 
years.  All data are from Compustat, for firms with total assets exceeding $50 million.  N is number of 
available firms for the respective year, Capex is Capital Expenditures (Compustat annual item #128), 
Depreciation is defined as Depreciation and Amortization (item 14) – Amortization of Intangibles 
(item 65), Sales of PPE is Sale of PPE (item 107), Level of PPE is PPE – Net (item 8) as of year-end6.   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 
6 Note that the amounts in Table 1 do not provide a full reconciliation of the PPE account, i.e., (Capex – Depreciation – 
Sales) does not equal Δ(Level of PPE).  The lack of reconciliation is due to the effects of M&As and write-downs of PPE, 
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 The idea behind the table is that capital expenditures increase the level of PPE, while depreciation and 
sales of PPE reduce the level of PPE.  So, by assessing the relative magnitudes of these amounts, one 
can judge the relative importance of PPE uses for internal and external purposes, and thus draw some 
conclusions about which model of financial reporting is more appropriate for such assets.  Figure 1 
provides a graphical view of some of the relations in Table 1, plotting the ratio of Sales of PPE to 
Depreciation in Panel A, and the ratio of Sales of PPE to Level of PPE in Panel B. 
An examination of Table 1 and Figure 1 reveals two main results relevant for our 
considerations.  First, the amount of Sales of PPE is small compared to the amount of Depreciation.  
Panel A of Figure 1 reveals that the ratio of these two amounts varies over the years but for all 
practical purposes it looks like it is bounded between 10 and 20 percent.  Thus, the use of PPE for 
internal purposes exceeds the use of PPE for external purposes on the magnitude of 5 to 10 times, 
which suggests that the primary use of PPE is by far internal to the firm and its operations.  Second, the 
amount of Sales of PPE is tiny compared to Level of PPE.  Panel B of Figure 1 reveals that the ratio of 
these two aggregate amounts hovers between 1 and 2.5 percent, suggesting that only a small amount of 
PPE is relevant for current considerations of PPE’s market value.  Such magnitudes also question the 
wisdom of fair value-type accounting for PPE and PPE-type assets.  If the motivation is that one needs 
to include the fair values of PPE on the balance sheet to reflect what such assets would fetch on the 
market, this motivation is strained considering that the fair values (even if they can be determined) are 
irrelevant for 98 to 99 percent of the assets.  This motivation is further strained when one considers 
that for the sake of properly reflecting the value of a small percentage of assets, one revises the value 
of all assets, and this revaluation flows through the income statement, injecting great volatility in 
earnings. 
The tenor of the empirical results above is consistent with business intuition and with 
arguments that firms primarily invest in PPE assets to use them in their production process, and that 
sales and market values of PPE are of second-order consideration and largely incidental to the 
business.  The implication is that the proper accounting for such assets needs to reflect this business 
reality and thus PPE accounting has to be primarily concerned with the internal use of PPE, and much 
less with the fluctuations of outside PPE values.  Thus, the income statement model of financial 
reporting is the natural basis for the accounting for such assets. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
for which Compustat provides insufficient detail.  Nevertheless, it is clear that Table 1 captures the first-order effects in the 
PPE account.   
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 Note that a large minority of business activities and whole businesses do follow a process of 
value creation which has a balance sheet orientation, and where balance sheet-based accounting is 
sensible.  A stark example is a firm whose only assets are marketable securities.  Since the assets are 
freely divisible and separable, and have value independent of the existence of the firm that holds them, 
keeping track of their changing values is all that one needs to know about this firm, and one would 
readily agree that “earnings” for this firm is just the changes in the value of the underlying assets 
during the current period.  The logic of this example can be extended to other situations, e.g., firms 
whose assets are undeveloped real estate holdings or a firm that holds a collection of patents.  To 
varying degrees, most financial firms also justify some sort of balance sheet-based accounting because 
most financial assets have values and lives, which are largely independent of the existence and 
operations of the company that holds them.   
Roughly speaking, the dividing line between income statement-oriented operations and balance 
sheet-oriented operations seems to be the distinction between operating and financing activities.  For 
financing types of assets and liabilities, and firms that hold them, a balance sheet-oriented accounting 
makes sense.  However, the balance sheet orientation seems inappropriate for the operating activities 
of most companies, which continually engage in the productive destruction of their assets, and where 
assets have little independent existence and therefore little independent and separable value.  As Paton 
and Littleton (1940) and many others have put it, most assets are “unexpired costs” rather than free-
standing economic units with independent and separable value.  Thus, for most types of firms, and for 
most types of activities, the income statement approach seems the natural fit for their process of value 
creation, while the balance sheet approach is the preferred option in more limited and specific 
circumstances.   
 
B. The alleged conceptual superiority of the balance sheet approach is unclear.  If anything, one 
can argue that the concept of income provides a clearer and stronger foundation for financial 
reporting 
The FASB has consistently expressed a belief that the balance sheet approach allows 
establishing a solid conceptual foundation, which naturally and logically leads to building the 
theoretical structure of financial accounting.  Specifically, the FASB considers the concept of “asset” 
as the most important and fundamental in accounting, and other concepts as derivative and secondary 
to it.  For example, “liabilities” are essentially the converse of “assets”, “equity” is the residual of asset 
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 and liabilities, “revenues” are increases in assets or decreases in liabilities, and “expenses” are 
decreases in assets or increases in liabilities, see Storey and Storey (1998) and Bullen and Crook 
(2005).  The structure of the accounting that results from this ordering indeed seems appealing but this 
paper argues that its foundations are far from solid, and from there the whole structure looks shaky.   
Recall that the FASB considers the balance sheet approach superior because earnings is a 
change in value, and one cannot define a change in value before establishing what value is, and that 
leads to asset and balance sheet-based accounting.  In light of this argument, consider the FASB’s 
formal definition of assets: "Assets are probable future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a 
particular entity as a result of past transactions or events" (Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 
6).  This definition states that an asset is something which brings future “benefits”, and probably the 
implied meaning here is net benefits, e.g., a rental property is an asset because it produces rental 
income after rental expenses.  However, in such a case net benefits sounds very much like “earnings”, 
which leads to circularity in FASB’s argument.  The FASB argues that asset-oriented accounting is 
superior to income-oriented accounting because one needs to define assets before one can define 
earnings, and then proceeds to define assets in terms of expected earnings!   
 The point is that economically the concept of asset and income are inextricably 
connected.  If there is income, one can infer that there is some type of economic asset that is producing 
it.  If tangible assets are not visible, then one can infer that there must be some intangible assets or 
what accountants call goodwill (the synergy of other assets) behind it.  And the converse applies as 
well, if one has an “asset”, that means there is some kind of a stream of income attached to it, 
otherwise it will not be an asset.  The FASB seems to suggest that the two concepts can be divorced 
and one can be made primary and superior to the other.  Perhaps what the Board had in mind was that 
sometimes it seems that there is no clear stream of income attached to an asset but it can be valued, 
perhaps based on an appraisal or some type of exchange or market value.  However, implicit in the 
appraisal or the market value is again some stream of future benefits or distribution of benefits, be it 
rental income, higher margins due to a successful brand, or dividends on stock.  Thus, the conceptual 
superiority of the balance sheet approach is unclear.   
If anything, one can argue that the concept of income is more fundamental and clear, especially 
in light of the increasing prominence of intangible assets.  As discussed above, the concept of income 
is crystal-clear in one-shot deals, e.g., selling for $10 something that cost $7 produces income of $3.  
For more realistic situations and firms, the concept of income is also reasonably clear over long 
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 horizons because by design income and net cash flows converge over such horizons, e.g., one can get a 
reasonably clear idea about “how much money” Microsoft made over a 10-year period.  The 
challenges of applying the income concept stem from the fact that most firms have continuous, 
overlapping and interwoven activities, and that the horizon of interest is short, e.g., it is a lot harder to 
say what “income” is for Microsoft over any given quarter.  However, these are not conceptual but 
operational and technical difficulties, and after all, it is precisely in solving such difficulties where the 
value-added of accounting is.  Otherwise, note that the clarity of the income concept is universal, it 
applies in a comparable manner from the most mundane to the most sophisticated business.  No matter 
whether the business is a coffee cart or a manufacturing company or a film studio or a biotech 
company, it is easy to see whether the company is “making money”, especially in the long run.  
In contrast, it is far from clear what the “assets” of Microsoft are, and how to account for them.  
The balance sheet for Microsoft lists some assets but these are not much help in accounting for 
Microsoft’s extraordinary profitability.  Based on the abnormal profits, one can infer that there must be 
some missing assets, and one can call them intangibles or goodwill or human capital or monopoly 
position or captive customer base but these will be just names, and the whole exercise is not very 
illuminating or helpful in practice.  The point is that today many, if not most, assets are elusive 
conceptually and difficult to operationalize in any helpful way.  The steadily growing market-to-book 
ratio of most firms is a succinct illustration and testament to this problem.  Ironically, those who try to 
derive estimates of intangible assets typically use projections and discounting of some sort of income 
to accomplish the task, e.g., one can derive the value of the Coca Cola brand by estimating the future 
price and volume premium due to the brand name, and discounting it to derive a present value.  Such 
derivations clearly reveal that the existence and valuation of intangible assets is derivative and 
conditional rather than fundamental.  This presents a tremendous practical problem considering that 
today intangible assets apparently account for a great part, and perhaps even the majority, of firm 
assets, e.g., the average market-to-book ratio is much higher than one, see also Lev (2003). 
 
C. Balance sheet accounting is likely a major contributor to the substantial temporal decline in 
the forward-looking usefulness of earnings 
Investors use earnings as the primary metric to evaluate prospective and existing investments.  
The classics of investment theory advise us to “buy earnings” and surveys reveal that investors and 
analysts consider earnings to be by far the single most important number about firms, e.g., Graham, 
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 Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005).  Note that the notion of earnings that investors find useful is not 
“changes in assets” but “recurring earnings”, essentially the current earnings that are the best predictor 
of the future stream of earnings that the firm will produce.  Thus, for investors good earnings means a 
metric that is highly persistent and predictive of future earnings. 
In contrast, the balance sheet approach views assets as the store of value and earnings as 
“changes in net assets”, which implies low persistence and predictability of earnings.  In the extreme, 
balance sheet accounting is pure mark-to-market accounting, where every asset and liability is updated 
to market or fair value each period.  Since it is well-known that market values have unpredictable 
changes (Samuelson 1965), pure market value accounting implies earnings which are pure noise, with 
high volatility and zero persistence and predictability.  Thus, the balance sheet approach creates 
earnings, which are at odds with what investors consider “good earnings”. 
Unfortunately, the empirical behavior of earnings suggests that this is not just a theoretical 
concern, and indeed a lot of damage has already been done.  Dichev and Tang (2007) examine the 
empirical properties of earnings of the 1,000 largest U.S. firms during the last 40 years, and find that 
comparable earnings volatility has more than doubled during this period, while earnings persistence 
has fallen from 0.91 to 0.65, a substantial deterioration in the basic properties of accounting earnings.  
This evidence is especially troubling because the study finds little change in the properties of the 
underlying revenues, expenses, and cash flows over the same period, and more generally the evidence 
suggests that the bulk of the changes in the properties of earnings are due to changes in the accounting 
rather than due to changes in the real economy.  On the practical level, the changes in the properties of 
earnings happen because the balance sheet approach mandates various asset revaluations, which result 
in an increasing number and magnitude of write-offs, “one-time” charges, and other non-recurring 
items.  Givoly and Hayn (2000) also find that the volatility of earnings has greatly increased over time, 
while the volatility of cash flows has largely remained the same.  Given these temporal changes in the 
properties of earnings, it is not surprising that Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) find that the relation 
between stock prices and earnings has become steadily weaker over time.   
Thus, existing research suggests that the balance sheet-based model of financial reporting has 
already produced a marked deterioration in the forward-looking informativeness of earnings.  Earnings 
today are much more volatile and less persistent, which implies that current earnings tells you less and 
less about future earnings.  If these trends continue unabated for another 30 to 50 years, there is a very 
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 real danger that earnings will become a meaningless number for forward-looking applications, 
something which will have far-reaching repercussions in many directions.   
One possible consequence is that useless earnings pose a threat to the very utility of the 
accounting system, and that may lead to an erosion of the accounting function and profession, at least 
as far as financial accounting is practiced today.  A related implication is that investors and their 
various proxies will increasingly turn to non-GAAP metrics of value.  The experience with pro forma 
earnings during the last 10 to 15 years offers a foretaste of what is to come, and the fact that it was a 
chaotic and confusing experience suggests that there are very real costs to producing inferior earnings.   
The deterioration in the informativeness of earnings also suggests the possibility of a further 
stratification between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors in the security markets.  One could 
argue that the major beneficiary from good earnings is small and unsophisticated investors, who tend 
to use heuristics like price-to-earnings ratios to value investments.  As long as current earnings is a 
good guide to future earnings, and thus provides a solid link to firm value, such heuristics work fairly 
well.  However, unsophisticated investors who continue to uncritically rely on earnings will 
increasingly feel like standing on shifting sand as the predictive power of earnings continues to erode.  
In contrast, sophisticated investors will have an increasingly keener edge over them because of their 
differential ability to understand and work through the mounting problems of earnings as a guide to 
investment value.  Given that one of the mandates of security regulators is to level the playing field in 
financial markets, it is ironic that the FASB, being the proxy for SEC in accounting standard setting, 
has implemented a course of action that threatens to produce the opposite result.   
 
D. There are substantial problems with applying the balance sheet-based model of accounting in 
practice  
Some of these problems have already been discussed in other sources, e.g., “mark-to-market”-
type accounting rules are difficult to apply when there are no reliable estimates of market values, and 
thus in practice firms have to resort to “mark-to-model” accounting instead.  Of course, the weakness 
of the “mark-to-model” approach is that it involves considerable managerial discretion with respect to 
inputs, and from there the potential for large estimation errors and outright manipulation.  For example, 
“mark-to-model” accounting became notorious after the fall of Enron, where it was extensively used to 
manage earnings, see Palepu and Healy (2003).  Although the Enron example is an extreme case, it 
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 illustrates the more general dangers of introducing much (and avoidable) subjectivity in estimating 
financial results. 
Because the subjectivity theme is already prominent in other sources, here the attention is on 
another point, which is less well-recognized.  Balance sheet-based accounting and especially its more 
extreme forms of mark-to-market and fair-value accounting, create a feedback loop between financial 
markets and the real economy, and may possibly lead to or exacerbate market bubbles.  Generally 
speaking, fair value accounting puts a lot of faith in market prices and elevates them into an unfailing 
standard of correctness.  This is a dangerous premise when market prices can deviate from 
fundamental values, something which recent research increasingly recognizes and documents, e.g., see 
reviews in Hirshleifer (2001) and Shleifer (2000).  Accounting needs to recognize the difference 
between the real economy, where real economic value is created, and the financial markets world, 
which makes educated guesses about the values of claims to real economy wealth and trades them.  For 
most firms, accounting needs to reflect their real economy activities, and provide inputs and 
independent checks on the valuation and trading process in financial markets.  Failure to do so 
confuses what is being measured and undermines the independent check function of accounting.  In the 
extreme of pure mark-to-market accounting, accounting and financial markets functions are fused, 
where firm performance and firm valuation become an empty and self-fulfilling tautology.  For 
example, markets go up because firms have earnings, which they have because markets are going up 
and their assets are revalued up (see also Plantin, Sapra, and Shin 2005 for an elaboration on this 
point).  And the converse happens when prices are heading down, in a self-propagating spiral.  Of 
course, to some extent this description is oversimplifying the matter to make the point – but we are 
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IV. Suggestions about what a “better” conceptual framework might look like  
As an extension and conclusion, this study offers some observations on what can potentially serve as a 
“better” model of financial reporting.  One caveat here is that, as clarified in Gonedes and Dopuch 
(1974), any discussion of “better” needs to be understood as taken from the perspective of a given user 
or constituency of financial reporting, especially if different constituencies have conflicting 
preferences.  Consistent with prevalent beliefs and FASB’s own statements (including the proposed 
new conceptual framework), this paper takes the outside investor perspective.   
The first major feature of an alternative model of financial reporting is a clear theoretical and 
practical distinction between operating and financing activities.  Operating activities include all 
activities, which are related to the regular business of the company, and which are related to the 
transformation of purchased and internally-produced inputs into goods and services to be sold on the 
open market.  Thus, operating activities here encompass most of what is labeled today as “operating” 
and “investing” activities.   
A defining feature of operating activities is that resources used in them (operating assets) have 
a primary purpose of supporting and enhancing these within-the-firm activities, and have only limited 
and peripheral value as independent, free-standing, and marketable stores of value, i.e., even if 
available, fair values for these assets are not reflective of their primary value to the company.  Thus, 
operating assets are primarily non-cash assets like PPE.  In contrast, financing activities revolve around 
cash and cash-equivalent assets and liabilities like marketable securities and perhaps accounts 
receivable, which are separable from the firm and have value that is largely independent from the 
firm’s fortunes.  In practice, there will be some controversy and debate about the precise operational 
divide between operating and financing assets and liabilities, and the demarcation between these two 
categories may shift depending on the nature of the business.  However, such controversies and 
judgments are nothing new for accounting, and in fact they are an integral part of its essence and utility 
to users of financial information.   
The important distinction between operating and financing assets and activities should be 
reflected in all financial statements.  The income statement needs to clearly identify the difference 
between earnings from regular operating activities, which have a lot of persistence and forward-
looking informativeness, and the earnings due to value fluctuations in financial assets, which have little 
persistence and predictive power.  Thus, accounting will have to move away from the hallowed notion 
of  a  single “bottom-line”,  a  number that neatly summarizes the entire performance of  the  firm.   Of  
 course, the abandonment of a bottom-line number leads to a regrettable loss of parsimony and could 
place at risk the pre-eminence of earnings in investor decisions.  However, the accumulation of 
changes in the business world and accounting has led to a situation where continuing to mix two very 
different sources of income also has substantial and probably higher costs, and thus the evolution 
towards two and maybe more groupings of income seems necessary.  This projected evolution is also 
in line with what is already happening.  In March 2007 the FASB revealed that it is considering 
sweeping changes in the way income is reported, including reporting separate income subtotals for a 
company’s operating, investing, financing, and tax activities, see Reilly (2007).   
The balance sheet also needs to separate assets from operating and financing activities because 
of their different nature and implications for valuation.  Operating assets are not really independent 
assets but essentially just a listing of unexpired costs.  One can rightly view them as a listing of shorter 
and longer-term operating bets or as commitments on streams of future operating costs.  Most of these 
costs will be realized internally, and there is little reason to pursue fair value accounting for them.  In 
other words, the value of these assets is value-in-use and there is no sense to use fair value or some 
other benchmark of outside utility to value them.  In contrast, financial assets are freely divisible and 
separable from the firm, and are almost by definition going to be realized on some market, and 
therefore some type of mark-to-market or fair value accounting makes sense for them.  The value of 
such assets is value-in-exchange, so exchange-based benchmarks of value are entirely appropriate.  
Finally, the cash flow statement also needs to make the distinction between cash generated from the 
company’s operations and from financing activities. 
The second major feature of an alternative model of financial reporting is renewed emphasis on 
the matching principle and, to a lesser extent, the revenue recognition principle as cornerstones of the 
accounting for operating activities.  Note that, as argued above, the accounting for cash-like value-in-
exchange assets is already well provided under the implemented and proposed rules of the fair value 
initiative.  However, there needs to be a re-alignment of the accounting for operating, value-in-use 
assets along the lines of the income statement model of financial reporting.  Most firms create value 
and are managed in an income statement mode, and thus accounting needs to follow and reflect this 
economic reality.  The two overriding principles in income statement accounting are the revenue 
recognition principle and the matching principle.  Thus, accounting needs to be clear about the 
definition and content of these two principles and then the more specific provisions have to align with 
and follow them.  Of these, the revenue recognition principle seems comparatively more 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Center for Excellence in Accounting & Security Analysis  21 
 
 straightforward, at least in theory; basically, revenue is earned when goods or services have been 
exchanged for cash or cash equivalents7.    
The matching principle, which relates relevant expenses to associated revenues, is thornier and 
produces considerable interpretation and implementation problems because many expenses are 
difficult to trace to specific revenues or periods.  However, repairing and re-affirming the primacy of 
these two principles shows a clear general direction in which to make progress.  If one is thinking 
about measuring performance for a given period, one has to derive a measure of the economic 
achievements (revenue) and the sacrifices that were made to accomplish these achievements 
(expenses), and performance is the difference between these two (earnings).  The practical upshot from 
these considerations is that income statement-oriented accounting has to concentrate its efforts on 
mapping the economic link between firm expenditures and receipts and translating this link into 
revenues and expenses.  For example, if there is a reliable link between R&D expenditures today and 
revenues for three years ahead, R&D expenditures need to be capitalized and expensed over the next 
three years.  The goal is to make the accounting reflect and follow the economic logic of the business 
as much as possible. 
If following the economic logic of the business is embraced as a guidepost for accounting, the 
argument for renewed emphasis on the matching principle is straightforward.  Most businesses are run 
on the explicit or implicit logic of matching costs and benefits.  Almost all managerial decisions 
contain an element of weighing the benefits of some action against the costs.  For example, in 
considering whether to open a new product line or a new division, managers make a projection of the 
investment and operating expenditures, and will only green-light the project if the corresponding cash 
inflows or other benefits exceed the costs by a requisite margin.  Thus, using matching in accounting is 
logical and necessary because it reflects the inescapable reality of cost-benefit considerations and 
results that pervade every business.   
In other words, matching considerations are at the very core of how businesses are run and 
create value, and may be even considered definitive of what a “business” is (i.e., an economic unit that 
produces a surplus of cash receipts over associated expenditures).  Thus, the real question is whether 
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7 There are significant practical difficulties in revenue recognition, however, when the contractual arrangements are 
complex, e.g., multiple deliverables, significant rights-of-return, contingencies.  In attempting to address these difficulties, 
the FASB and the IASB have embarked on a multi-year project aimed to align revenue recognition with the balance-sheet 
based model of financial reporting.  At this point, it is unclear what the specifics of the final product will be but there is a 
high chance that these new rules will be another substantial deviation away from the income statement model. 
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 accounting will choose to incorporate this core feature of business, and to what extent.  If accounting 
aims to be a faithful reflection of the business, its core principles should reflect the core drivers of the 
business, and this intuition suggests that matching considerations should be a pivot for the financial 
reporting system.  Of course, accounting can choose to ignore this intuition but that may prove perilous 
considering that matching is hard-wired in the essence of what a business is and how it runs. 
Unfortunately, the current thinking at the FASB and the IASB completely ignores the concept 
of matching.  An inspection of the Preliminary Views for a new conceptual framework reveals the 
consideration of a number of useful concepts like relevance, faithful representation, comparability, etc. 
but there is not a single reference to matching.  In contrast, this paper argues that, together with 
revenue recognition, matching should be the cornerstone of financial reporting, and failing that, all 
these other concepts are deficient in content and utility.   
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V. Conclusion 
The development of a full alternative model of financial reporting is a formidable task and thus these 
observations are offered more with the intent to spark a debate rather than as a solution.  The 
accounting standard setters are currently re-considering the foundations of financial reporting, and the 
repercussions of this process will be felt for decades to come.  This is the right time to join these 
deliberations because the costs of having a deficient reporting model are substantial and far-reaching.  
The converse is also true; accounting touches many levels and functions of society, and having the 
right model of reporting contributes to the welfare of us all.  
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Stocks and flows of aggregate U.S. PPE during 1990 to 2005 




Year N Capex Depreciation Sales of PPE Level of PPE
1990 3,619 588,533 292,801 35,754 3,776,710
1991 3,728 591,587 309,991 43,434 3,939,801
1992 4,025 593,316 330,693 44,310 4,097,584
1993 4,403 619,158 376,048 43,663 4,249,339
1994 4,710 717,832 508,367 48,361 4,729,200
1995 5,163 814,474 579,783 47,319 5,053,372
1996 5,560 937,737 624,720 74,077 5,509,646
1997 5,622 1,027,705 674,603 87,549 5,712,572
1998 5,779 1,106,928 749,954 140,869 6,182,074
1999 5,967 1,169,959 819,191 181,581 6,768,889
2000 5,919 1,316,866 912,476 170,846 7,144,928
2001 5,445 1,284,313 969,085 173,581 7,355,361
2002 5,315 1,159,903 940,677 162,151 7,566,578
2003 5,220 1,108,077 1,017,712 140,846 8,048,863
2004 5,146 1,215,723 1,032,240 120,858 8,366,860
2005 4,473 1,133,675 821,247 100,062 7,042,813
 
 
All data are from Compustat, for firms with assets exceeding $50 million.  N is number of available 
firms for the respective year.  Capex is Capital Expenditures (Compustat annual item #128), 
Depreciation is defined as Depreciation and Amortization (item 14) – Amortization of Intangibles 













Center for Excellence in Accounting & Security Analysis  27 
 



































The themes developed in this study have benefited from numerous discussions over the 
years with Greg Waymire, Steve Zeff, Shiva Rajgopal, Jim Ohlson, Sudipta Basu, Richard 
Sloan, Patty Dechow, and many other colleagues in the profession.  Special thanks to Steve 
Penman, who provided detailed comments and guidance on this project.  The author 
gratefully acknowledges funding from the Center for Excellence in Accounting and Security 




People at the Center 
Trevor Harris, Vice Chairman, Morgan Stanley; Co-Director, CEASA 
 
Stephen Penman, George O. May Professor of Accounting, Columbia Business School; Co-Director, CEASA 
 
Svetlana Juster, Associate Director of Research, Columbia Business School, CEASA 
 







Arthur Levitt, Jr., 25th Chairman of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (1993-2001), Senior 
Advisor, The Carlyle Group  
 
Board Members  
 
Philip D. Ameen, Vice President and Comptroller, General Electric Company  
 
Mark J.P. Anson, Chief Executive Officer, Hermes Pensions Management Limited 
 
John H. Biggs, Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, TIAA-CREF  
 
Richard Carroll, Chief Accountant, IBM  
 
J. Michael Cook, Retired Chairman and CEO, Deloitte & Touche LLP  
 
Sir Howard J. Davies, Director, London School of Economics and Political Science; Former Chair, Financial 
Services Authority, United Kingdom  
 
Peter Fisher, Managing Director & Chairman, BlackRock Asia, BlackRock, Inc.  
 
Sallie Krawcheck, CFO & Head of Strategy, Citigroup, Inc.  
 
David F. Larcker, Professor of Accounting, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 
 
Carol J. Loomis, Editor-at-Large, FORTUNE Magazine  
 
Robert J. Swieringa, Dean, S.C. Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University; Former Member, 
Financial Accounting Standards Board 
 
© 2007 Center for Excellence in Accounting and Security Analysis
